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CITIZENS AND NONCITIZENS IN EUROPE:
EUROPEAN UNION MEASURES AGAINST
TERRORISM AFTER SEPTEMBER 11
Sophie Robin-Olivier*
Abstract: In the European Union, new anti-terror measures have had an
impact on the lives of noncitizens, immigrants, and asylum-seekers. This
Essay outlines the rights guaranteed to both citizens and noncitizens
under the European Convention on Human Rights and the EU treaties
and evaluates how these rights have limited harsh treatment of noncitizens
in the ªght against terrorism. Although suspicion and rejection of non-
citizens are widespread, there remains hope for broadening the principles
of equality and fundamental rights to third country nationals through an
open conception of the notion of European citizenship.
Introduction
Is the European Union’s use of the citizen/noncitizen distinction
in its post-September 11 ªght against terrorism distinguishable from
that of the United States? This is not a simple question. On the one
hand, the situation of immigrants on both sides of the Atlantic has
generally deteriorated. On the other hand, the lives of noncitizens do
not seem to have changed in Europe as they have in the United
States. Many factors help to explain this difference, including the par-
ticular trauma caused by the terrorist attacks on U.S. territory and,
from a legal standpoint, the apparent framing of the ªght against ter-
ror in terms of war and wartime powers in the United States.
The Madrid attacks may well change the situation. General Hami-
dou Laanigri, Morocco’s chief of security indicated in a recent inter-
view that “[t]he Madrid bombings ªnally have forced the Europeans to
make their investigations more serious and their cooperation quicker
and more operational.”1 But he added the following interesting com-
ment: “[W]e are victims of laws and guarantees that protect the rights
                                                                                                                     
* Professor, University of Paris-X, Codirector of the Center for European and Compara-
tive Law Studies (CEJEC). The author is extremely grateful to Professor Daniel Kanstroom
for suggesting and supporting this work.
1 Elaine Sciolino, Morocco Connection Is Emerging as Sleeper Threat in Terror War, N.Y.
Times, May 16, 2004, at A3.
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of individuals at the expense of cracking down against organized
crime.”2 A similar analysis was offered shortly after the Madrid bomb-
ings by Sergio Romano, a former Italian ambassador to Russia and
NATO: “Every European country has strengthened its police and judi-
ciary since 9/11. But they cannot go much beyond that. There is a
great deal of resistance in Europe to more radical measures impinging
on individual rights.”3 My purpose in this Essay is to explain European
resistance to more radical law enforcement measures and, in particular
to those measures targeting noncitizens.
Assessing the European situation on this subject requires an analy-
sis on two levels, because both the ªght against terrorism and immigra-
tion policies are matters on which the European Union (EU) and its
constituent Member States have shared competence.4 Drawing a com-
                                                                                                                     
2 Id.
3 Alan Riding, Europe Knows Fear, But This Time It’s Different, N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 2004,
§ 4, at 1.
4 See Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Trea-
ties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Oct. 2,
1997, O.J. (C 340) art. 2(15) (1997) [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam]. Only recently
has the EU been granted some powers to deal with security and immigration. These issues
ªrst belonged to the so-called “third pillar” of the EU, introduced by the Maastricht Treaty
(formally, the Treaty on European Union) and signed on February 2, 1992, to deal with
“justice and home affairs.” Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 253, 1992
O.J. (C 191) 1, 61–62 [hereinafter Treaty on EU]. At that time, EU powers were very
limited, because decisionmaking required the unanimity of all Member States. The Un-
ion’s powers derive from amendments to the Treaty of Amsterdam, speciªcally the Treaty’s
new title establishing the European Community (EC) (the “ªrst pillar”), called Visas, Asy-
lum, Immigration and Other Policies Related to Free Movement of Persons. See Treaty of
Amsterdam, supra, art. 2(15). The insertion into the ªrst pillar allows the use of EC pro-
cedures including decisionmaking by the majority and submission to the jurisdiction of the
European Court of Justice. See Treaty Establishing the European Community, Nov. 10,
1997, O.J. (C 340) 3, arts. 64, 68 (1997) [hereinafter EC Treaty]. Some provisions on
police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters have remained in the third pillar of the
treaty on the EU. Both the ªrst and third pillar provisions intend to create “an area of
freedom, security and justice.” See EC Treaty, supra, art. 61; Treaty on EU, supra, art. 29.
They have been fostered by the body of rules developed outside the European Union that
are based on the Schengen Agreements (on the free movement of people, signed by some
Member States on June 14, 1985 and June 19, 1990), which is now part of EU law. See
Treaty of Amsterdam, supra, Protocol Integrating the Schengen Acquis into the Frame-
work of the European Union. The Schengen acquis, composed of the Schengen Agree-
ment and the other provisions adopted in that context, is incorporated into EU law,
whereas formerly, it was only international law deriving from an agreement between States
(outside the ªeld of EU law). Despite the increasing power of the EU, Member States have
not abandoned their own power on these matters. Criminal law and criminal procedure
remain, for the most part, within states’ powers. Where EU power to act exists but has not
yet been exercised, such as in the ªeld of immigration law, Member States remain free to
adopt speciªc legislation in the absence of a common rule. On the issue of preemption, see
Koenraad Lenaerts, Le Juge et la Constitution aux États-Unis d’Amérique et dans
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plete overview of the situation in twenty-ªve Member States, as well as
at the EU level, however, would be a very ambitious enterprise. Given
limits of space and time, this Essay will, therefore, not attempt to de-
scribe, analyze and compare twenty-six different legal systems, but will
focus on the European Union’s legal system. The Essay considers the
effects of the EU legal system both within Member States and at the EU
level. This approach, of course, tends to neglect many factors, most im-
portantly the particular systems of constitutional and other legal checks
and balances in each Member State. Such internal constitutional mech-
anisms undoubtedly play a crucial role in the Member States and can
explain the deviations in their responses to terrorism.It is also true,
however, that the EU legal system has an increasing inºuence on the
legal orders of Member States. In particular, the ªelds of human rights
and immigration law are no longer insulated by sovereignty, and there-
fore, these ªelds are well within its reach.
In Europe, as in the United States, measures ostensibly designed
to ªght terrorism have reºected hardline attitudes and have pointedly
targeted noncitizens. In dealing with security and immigration issues,
the EU has taken a number of steps that tend to reduce the rights and
freedoms of noncitizens. Some of these measures require actions to
be taken by Member States.5 European nations and the EU have
maintained and strengthened their control over noncitizens through
harsh immigration policies and measures to police their external
borders.6 A general expansion of the police power at the border has
thus implicated fundamental rights and freedoms of “foreigners.”
                                                                                                                     
l’Ordre Juridique Européen 577–78 (1998); Denys Simon, Le Système Juridique
Communautaire 147–49 (3d ed. 2001); Eugene Daniel Cross, Pre-emption of Member State
Law in the European Economic Community: A Framework for Analysis, 29 Common Mkt. L. Rev.
447 (1992); António Goucha Soares, Pre-emption, Conºicts of Powers and Subsidiarity, 23 Eur.
L. Rev. 132 (1998). Even then, Member States remain entitled to ensure law and order and
the safeguarding of internal security on their territory. See EC treaty, supra, art. 64 (stat-
ing that “[t]his title shall not affect the exercise of the responsibilities incumbent upon
Member States with regard to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of
internal security.”).
5 See discussion infra Part II. Some of the European measures imply enforcement ac-
tions by Member States, which tend to harden national policies toward immigration and
especially illegal immigration.
6 See discussion infra Part II. Enlargement of the EU to twenty-ªve states this year, with
the addition of ten new countries, has made the issue of external border control a growing
concern. “A new border control plan was agreed in a matter of weeks in spring 2002. It will
be spearheaded by a new unaccountable body: the chiefs of EU border police, meeting
regularly in Brussels, who will be coordinating sixteen different ad hoc groups working on
different aspects of border control. This will include operations at land borders, sea bor-
ders and international airports and mass joint expulsion exercises, each likely to involve
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Particular features of the European Union’s legal system and iden-
tity may, however, conªne and even counterbalance the impact of anti-
terrorism measures on noncitizens. Discrimination against noncitizens
does not ªt easily within the current construction of European identity.
Although fragile and uncertain, this construction is based on a system
of protection of fundamental rights that recognizes the universality of
human rights and emphasizes nondiscrimination. Part I of this Essay
illustrates how this system of fundamental rights is inconsistent with
drastic measures against noncitizens. Part II, however, demonstrates
that the system does not forestall measures directed at noncitizens
purely for immigration policy purposes. A further and equally vital con-
sideration is the emerging notion of European citizenship. This new
citizenship, by its very deªnition, could lead to new kinds of distinc-
tions between citizens and noncitizens. At present, however, the con-
cept of European citizenship tends to blur the distinction between na-
tionals and non-nationals of Member States and may, in fact, foster a
new line of distinction dependent on degree of integration into Euro-
pean society. Part III of this Essay addresses the issue of citizenship and
the fading color of nationality in the European Union.
I. Protecting Noncitizens Within the European System for the
Protection of Fundamental Rights
A. Fundamental Rights
Universality of human rights and the principle of nondiscrimina-
tion are essential attributes of the European system for the protection
of human rights. This system derives mainly from the European Con-
vention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms (“ECHR” or “Convention”), which all Member States of the EU
have ratiªed and to which the EU itself adheres.7 Since the mid-1970’s,
the protection of fundamental rights has been enhanced, albeit within
the limited jurisdiction of EU law, by the EU’s speciªc system for the
protection of fundamental rights.
The ECHR secures universality of fundamental rights by its ªrst
article, which prevents the exclusion of noncitizens from the scope of
                                                                                                                     
foreign border police exercising controls at the borders of other Member States.” Immigra-
tion and Asylum in the EU After 11 September 2001, Statewatch News Online (Sept. 2002),
at http://www.statewatch.org/news/2002/sep/analy14.htm.
7 See Treaty on EU, supra note 4, art. 6. See generally European Convention for the Pro-
tection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221
[hereinafter European Convention].
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the protection of the Convention.8 Rights and freedoms are granted to
all persons, regardless of nationality.9 In this respect, the Convention is
not unique. Many believe that the very nature of human rights requires
universality and the major international conventions are grounded on
this view.10
Universality is not so evident, however, with regard to fundamental
rights based in constitutions that are designed to protect citizens’ rights.
The potential contradiction between the two approaches is particularly
evident in the recently adopted Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union (the “EU Charter”), which is best described as a hy-
brid document: part-international convention, part-constitution.11 Still,
the Charter reserves only a limited number of rights to residents or EU
citizens alone, thus departing only slightly from universality.12
Noncitizens beneªt from most of the rights and freedoms guar-
anteed to EU citizens and residents. For instance, article 3 of the
ECHR, which prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading treat-
ments, has been invoked quite successfully by noncitizens to prevent
deportation. The European Court of Human Rights (the “Court”)
precludes Member States from deporting a person whenever a risk
exists that this person could be exposed to torture or inhuman treat-
ment in the receiving country.13 This reasoning also applies, accord-
ing to the Court, when the person has a serious disease and deporta-
tion would lead to a rapid and certain deterioration of his or her
health.14
                                                                                                                     
8 See European Convention, supra note 7, art. 1, 213 U.N.T.S. at 224.
9 Id. (stating that “[t]he . . . Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms . . . of this Convention.”).
10 See Danièle Lochak, La Défense D’un Point de Vue «Étranger», in La Charte des Dro-
its Fondamentaux de l’Union Européenne 205, 212 ( Jean-Yves Carlier & Olivier De
Schutter eds., 2002); see, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N.
GAOR, 3rd Sess., 183d plen. mtg. at 135-42, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 173.
11 See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Dec. 18, 2000,
O.J. (C 364) 20 (2000) [hereinafter Charter of Fundamental Rights]. The Charter was
adopted in December of 2000. Id. at 6. The legal value of this charter remains uncertain, as
it is not part of the treaties by which member states are bound, nor is it derived from them.
However, the EU judiciary is likely to rely on its authority more and more often.
12 See id. arts. 15, 39–46, at 11–12, 18–19.
13 See, e.g., Soering v. United Kingdom, App. No. 14038/88, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 439, 464,
467–69, 478 (1989) (holding that extradition of the applicant to Virginia, where he would
likely be placed on death row, would breach article 3 of the ECHR).
14 See, e.g., Bensaïd v. United Kingdom, App. No. 44599/98, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 10, 217–
18 (2001) (considering applicant’s schizophrenia, but ªnding that the risk that his condi-
tion would deteriorate if he was deported to Algeria was speculative); D. v. United King-
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Article 8, which guarantees the right to family life, has also been
utilized by noncitizens in deportation cases.15 Concerning family life,
the Court typically assumes that the “decision to expel, or indeed not to
admit a family member . . . [to its territory] constitutes an ‘interfer-
ence’ with the right to respect for family life.”16 The Court places the
burden of establishing that the family could relocate on the expelling
authorities before assessing the proportionality of the interference.17
This case law has compelled legislative transformation within
Member States. The recent French statute on immigration is an ex-
ample.18 Although hardening French immigration law in some ways,
the new statute also embraces the guarantees of articles 3 and 8 of the
Convention. It prohibits the deportation of a number of people who
are “fully integrated,” one way of enforcing the right to family life.19 It
also precludes deportation if a medical condition requires treatment
in France and the absence of treatment would induce consequences
                                                                                                                     
dom, App. No. 30240/96, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 423, 447–48 (1997) (ªnding that it would
violate article 3 to deport applicant with AIDS to St. Kitts).
15 See European Convention, supra note 7, arts. 3, 8, 213 U.N.T.S. at 224, 230; see also
Mehemi v. France, App. No. 25017/94, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. 739, 750–51, 753 (1997); Beld-
joudi v. France, App. No. 12083/86, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. 801, 830–31, 833–34 (1992); Mous-
taquim v. Belgium, App. No. 12313/86, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 802, 813–15 (1991). Other cases
reveal a more restrictive conception of article 8. See Bouchelkia v. France, App. No.
23078/93, 25 Eur. H.R. Rep. 686, 704–07 (1997); Boughanemi v. France, App. No.
22070/93, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 228, 244–48 (1996); C. v. Belgium, App. No. 21794/93, 32
Eur. H.R. Rep. 2, ¶¶ 21–36 (1996). According to this case law, the removal of a person
from a country where close members of his family are living is allowed if it meets the re-
quirements of paragraph 2 of article 8. See Bouchelkia, 25 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 705–06;
Boughanemi, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 245–46. Removal must be in accordance with the law,
meaning that it is motivated by one or more of the legitimate aims under that paragraph
and necessary in a democratic society; that is, a pressing social need, proportionate to the
desired and legitimate aim, must justify removal. See Bouchelkia, 25 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 705–
06; Boughanemi, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 245–46. The European Court of Human Rights high-
lighted the limits of what is “necessary in a democratic society” where a spouse has com-
mitted an offense in Boultif v. Switzerland and Amrollahi v. Denmark. See Amrollahi v. Den-
mark, App. No. 56811/00, ¶¶ 33–44 ( July 11, 2002), at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/
tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=56811/00&sessionid=
1352664&skin=hudoc-en (refraining from deportation of applicant despite a conviction of
drug trafªcking); Boultif v. Switzerland, App. No. 54273/00, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 50, 1187–88
(2001) (deciding against deportation although the applicant was convicted of robbery and
damage of property).
16 See Mehemi, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 750–51, 753; Beldjoudi, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 830–31,
833–34; Moustaquim, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 813–15; Nicola Rogers, Immigration and the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights: Are New Principles Emerging?, 2003 Eur. Hum. Rts. L. Rev.
1, 53–64.
17 Rogers, supra note 16, at 53, 55–57, 62–64.
18 See Law No. 2003–1119 of Nov. 26, 2003, J.O., Nov. 27, 2003, p. 20,136 (Fr.).
19 See id. art. 21.
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of an exceptional nature, another requirement inspired by the inter-
pretation of article 3 by the Court of Human Rights.20
The European system of protection also guarantees to nonciti-
zens the essential right to a fair trial.21 Article 6 of the ECHR is of lim-
ited applicability, however, in deportation cases. The European Court
of Human Rights has ruled that deportation measures are not within
the scope of article 6, which extends only to the determination of
“civil rights and obligations” and “criminal charges.”22 Noncitizens
may, nonetheless, successfully invoke article 6 in other circumstances.
For instance, a person facing extradition is “facing criminal charge” in
the language of the Convention and may thus rely on article 6.23 Addi-
tionally, article 13 of the ECHR guarantees an effective remedy when
rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention are violated.24 As the
Court decided in a recent case, it precludes the execution of a depor-
tation order before the conclusion of an investigation by national
authorities as to its compatibility with the Convention.25 Moreover, the
EU Charter does not limit, as does the ECHR, the scope of the right
to a fair trial.26 Thus, in the EU, this right could include deportation
measures, as long as they fall within the sphere of EU law. That sphere
is, however, currently restricted to reviewing deportations that affect
free movement within the European Union, rather than deportations
to non-EU countries. Extension depends on the ability of Member
States to move further in deªning a common immigration policy.
More generally, any person who is arrested and detained to pre-
vent his unauthorized entry into the country or against whom action
is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition is entitled to
protection under the right to liberty, contained in article 5 of the
ECHR.27 Article 5 requires prompt provision of information to the
person about the reason for his arrest and any charges against him.28
                                                                                                                     
20 Id. art. 7.
21 European Convention, supra note 7, art. 6, 213 U.N.T.S. at 228.
22 See Agee v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7729/76, 7 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep.
164, 175–76 (1976); Uppal v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8244/78, 3 Eur. H.R. Rep. 391,
398 (1980).
23 See generally Jean-François Renucci, Droit Européen des Droits de L’Homme,
(3d ed. 2002) (providing an analysis of extradition and the use of article 6).
24 European Convention, supra note 7, art. 13, 213 U.N.T.S. at 232.
25 See Conka v. Belgium, App. No. 51564/99, 34 Eur. H.R. Rep. 54, 1326 (2002) (con-
cerning deportation of Slovakian nationals of Romany origin).
26 Compare Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra note 11, with European Conven-
tion, supra note 7, art. 6, 213 U.N.T.S. at 228.
27 See European Convention, supra note 7, art. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. at 226.
28 Id.
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It also mandates legal “proceedings by which the lawfulness of [the]
detention shall be decided speedily by a court and . . . release ordered
if the detention is not lawful.”29 The Court of Human Rights strictly
enforced these provisions to prevent arbitrary detention of nonciti-
zens30 and to limit the possibility of detaining a noncitizen in the in-
ternational zone of an airport.31
One of the most controversial issues in the international “war on
terrorism” is the U.S. detentions at Guantanamo Bay. In a report dis-
cussing the detentions, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe32 stated that the practice would not pass muster under the
European standard.33 The Assembly pointed out that established case
law of the European Court of Human Rights requires a prisoner to be
“released pending trial as soon as continued detention ceases to be
reasonable [because] only ‘the existence of a genuine requirement of
public interest’ can, having regard to the presumption of innocence,
justify departure from the rule of respect for individual liberty.”34 The
Assembly added that, if plausible reasons exist to suspect the arrested
person of having committed an offense, continued pretrial detention
must satisfy two conditions.35 First, “there must be ‘relevant’ and
‘sufªcient’ reasons that continue after a certain lapse of time to le-
gitimize custody.”36 Second, “special diligence” is required on the part
                                                                                                                     
29 Id.; see Protocol No. 7 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, as Amended by Protocol No. 11, Nov. 22, 1984, art. 1, Eur. T.S.
117, 34, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/CadreListTraites.htm (giving
lawfully resident aliens right not to be expelled without due process) [hereinafter Protocol
No. 7]. But the protection is weakened by the recognized possibility for this right to be
denied when “expulsion is necessary in the interests of public order or is grounded on rea-
sons of national security.” See Protocol No. 7, supra, art. 1.
30 Bozano v. France, App. No. 9990/82, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 297, 313 (1986).
31 Amuur v. France, App. No. 19776/92, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 533, 556–57 (1996). The
stay in an international zone must not be too long, judicial review of the measure must
take place rapidly, and the asylum seeker must not be prevented from applying for recog-
nition as an asylee. Id. at 557. Although conªrming the right of States to control access of
noncitizens to their territory, the decision lays down fundamental rights for migrants and
asylum seekers. See id. at 556–60.
32 The Parliamentary Assembly is one of the two statutory organs of the Council of
Europe composed of elected members of national Parliaments, and is wholly separate
from EU institutions.
33 See Rights of Persons Held in the Custody of the United States in Afghanistan or Guantanamo
Bay, Eur. Parl. Ass., Doc. No. 9817, ¶ II(E) (2003), available at http://assembly.coe.int/
Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc03/EDOC9817.htm [hereinafter Rights of Persons].
34 Id. ¶ II(B)(d)(29).
35 Id.
36 Id.
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of the authorities in the conduct of the proceedings.”37 The Assembly
also mentioned that the Convention recognizes the right for anyone
held in custody to begin legal proceedings and to seek a judicial rul-
ing on the lawfulness of his or her detention.38
Although the outlook is promising, however, a basic issue remains
controversial: whether the European protection of human rights ap-
plies outside the territory of Member States.39 To date, the European
Court of Human Rights has dealt with this issue in only one case. In
that case, the Court held that “[t]he Convention was not designed to be
applied throughout the world, even [with] respect [to] the conduct of
Contracting States.”40 It noted that jurisdiction over non-Contracting
States has been recognized only when the territory in question would
normally have been covered by the Convention, but for the speciªc cir-
cumstances of the case, such as the occupation of northern Cyprus by
Turkey.41
With the possible exception of the territoriality issue, however, the
Convention’s universality efªciently protects noncitizens against depri-
vations of human rights. The efªcacy of the European system of protec-
tion could explain why only one country in Europe, the United King-
dom, has signiªcantly deviated from it. In 2001, the United Kingdom
introduced special proceedings to arrest and detain aliens, a departure
from the requirement of article 5 of the ECHR, to enhance national
security after September 11.42 When non-British nationals are certiªed
as suspected international terrorists, their detention without trial is al-
lowed.43 Challenges to certiªcation can be heard by a Special Immigra-
tion and Appeals Commission (SIAC) and appeals can be lodged only
                                                                                                                     
37 Id. For an example of a violation by France, see Tomasi v. France, App. No. 12850/87,
15 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 49–50, 52–54 (1992).
38 Rights of Persons, supra note 33, ¶ II(B)(d)(28).
39 See Frédéric Sudre et al., Les Grands Arrêts de la Cour Européenne des
Droits de l’Homme 534–35 (2003).
40 See BankoviG v. Belgium, App. No. 52207/99, ¶ 8 (Dec. 19, 2001), at http://europa.
eu.int. Contracting states are those bound by the Convention.
41 Id.
42 Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24, §§ 21–35 (Eng.), available at
http://www.legislation.hmso.gov/uk/acts/acts2001/20010024.htm [hereinafter ATCSA];
see Home Secretary David Blunkett, Address at Harvard Law School (Mar. 8, 2004), at
http://www.homeofªce.gov.uk/docs3/hs_speech_harvard04.htm (explaining that the Act
was justiªed by national security reasons).
43 See ATCSA, c. 24, §§ 21, 25–26 (providing for the certiªcation of individuals who are
suspected of being terrorists and whose presence in the territory is considered a danger to
national security).
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on points of law before the Court of Appeal.44 This departure from ar-
ticle 5 to ensure national security has been severely criticized,45 despite
the British government’s explanation that it is sanctioned by article 15
of the Convention, which authorizes derogations “in time of war or
other public emergency threatening the life of the nation.”46 Further-
more, the British law arguably does not depart excessively from article
5, as it allows access to a court of law to decide whether the detention is
lawful. A recent decision has shown that this system of checks and bal-
ances has some efªcacy. In a case decided on March 18, 2004, the
Court of Appeal upheld a SIAC decision that deemed a detention un-
justiªed because it was based on unreliable evidence that should not
have been used and no “reasonable suspicion” existed that the detainee
had links to Al Qaeda.47
Criticism has also been leveled at Swedish deportations of asylum
seekers suspected of terrorism through a procedure under which the
government is the sole decisionmaker, and which proscribes the ability
to appeal or obtain review.48 Sweden has been accused of disregarding
human rights in its campaign against terrorism, because it allows de-
portation of asylum seekers to their country of origin without sufªcient
efforts to monitor guarantees that their human rights would be re-
spected.49 Similarly, the recent amendment to the Italian immigration
law “Bossi Fini” has been vigorously condemned for its failure to abide
by European protections of human rights, particularly article 3 of the
ECHR, in deportation procedures.50 Although these examples show
                                                                                                                     
44 Id. c. 24, §§ 25–26, 30. The Court of Appeal, together with the High Court of Justice,
compose England’s Supreme Court of Judicature, and hears both civil and criminal ap-
peals.
45 See Human Rights Watch, Commentary on the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill 2001
(Nov. 16, 2001), at http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/eca/UKleg1106.htm; Privy Coun-
sellor Review Committee, Antiterrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 Review: Re-
port 52, 52-53 (2003), available at http://www.homeofªce.gov.uk/docs3/newton_comm
ittee_report_2003.pdf.
46 See European Convention, supra note 7, art. 15, 213 U.N.T.S. at 232.
47 M. v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, 2 All E.R. 863, 871–73 (Eng.C.A. 2004).
48 See EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights, The Balance
Between Freedom and Security in the Response by the European Union and its
Member States to the Terrorist Threats 38 (2003), available at http://europa.eu.int/
comm/justice_home/fsj/rights/network/obs_thematique_en.pdf (describing the Swedish
Special Control of Alien Act of 1991) [hereinafter Balance Between Freedom and Secu-
rity].
49 Id. at 38–39.
50 See generally Michele Totah, Fortress Italy: Racial Politics and the New Immigration
Amendment in Italy, 26 Fordham Int’l L.J. 1438 (2003) (discussing Italy’s violation of arti-
cle 3 of the Convention).
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that the European system, as any legal system, is not wholly effective,
they can be viewed optimistically as exceptions conªrming the rule.
B. The Principle of Nondiscrimination
Let us now turn to the principle of nondiscrimination to assess
whether it has had any effect against the adoption of discriminatory
measures in the ªght against terrorism. Nondiscrimination is a general
principle of EU law, and one of the most vital fundamental rights rec-
ognized by the EU.51 The ECHR also establishes a principle of nondis-
crimination in article 14, requiring that the rights and freedoms set
forth in the Convention be secured without discrimination of any
kind.52 This principle does not, however, prevent distinctions based on
nationality that can be justiªed by the particular status of noncitizens.
Where entry, residence, and activity on the national territory are con-
cerned, noncitizenship status allows legal distinction. Immigration
policies are grounded on this distinction, and neither EU law nor the
ECHR question immigration law’s basic legitimacy.
Yet outside the particular ªelds of immigration law and policies,
the nondiscrimination principle has been strictly enforced by the
European Court of Human Rights to prevent unwarranted distinc-
tions along nationality lines. For instance, the Court has decided that
public beneªts, which in several countries have long been reserved to
citizens, could no longer be so restricted.53 In the ªght against terror-
ism, the prohibition of unwarranted nationality distinctions likely en-
couraged governments to choose measures detached from the distinc-
                                                                                                                     
51 See Case 103/77, Royal Scholten Hönig v. Intervention Bd. for Agric. Produce, 1978
E.C.R. 2037, 2043–44, 2058–59 (discussing possible discrimination against manufacturers
of isoglucose). For a comprehensive analysis on the principle of nondiscrimination in EU
law, see generally Sophie Robin-Olivier, Le Principe d’Égalité en Droit Communau-
taire, Etude à Partir des Libertés Économiques (1999).
52 European Convention, supra note 7, art. 14, 213 U.N.T.S. at 232. Note, however, the
difªculty in adopting a provision similar to Protocol 12 to the ECHR, which extended the
right to nondiscrimination so that it would apply to “any right set forth by law”: the proto-
col, signed on November 4, 2000, has not yet attained the requisite ten ratiªcations to be
entered into force. See Protocol No. 12 to the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 2000, art. 1, Europ. T.S. No. 177, 2, available at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/CadreListTraites.htm. States are reluctant to be
bound by such a sweeping principle of nondiscrimination.
53 See Koua Poirrez v. France, App. No. 40892/98, 2, 12–13 (Sept. 13, 2003), at
http://www.worldlii.org/cgi-bin/download.cgi/download/eu/cases/ECHR/2003/459.rtf;
Gaygusuz v. Austria, App. No. 17371/90, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 364, 381–82 (1996).
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tion between citizens and noncitizens.54 Security-based restrictions on
fundamental rights and freedoms have typically not relied on distinc-
tions based on nationality. Personal data protection is a leading ex-
ample. State interception of traditional and electronic communica-
tions, transmission, and centralization of data are now easier virtually
everywhere, raising great concerns for the protection of fundamental
rights of all individuals, whether they are citizens or noncitizens.55
Once again, the United Kingdom is the exception. Its Anti-
terrorism, Crime, and Security Act concerns only the arrest and deten-
tion of noncitizens, while equally suspect British citizens are not subject
to its provisions.56 It has been criticized by the Council of Europe’s
Commissioner for Human Rights, who has stated, “In so far as these
measures are applicable only to . . . foreigners, they might appear . . . to
be ushering in a two-track [system of] justice, whereby different human
rights standards apply to foreigners and nationals.”57 When challenged
on the basis of article 14 of the ECHR, this distinction was condemned
by the SIAC, but the Court of Appeal overruled the decision.58 The
Lord Chief Justice, Lord Woolf invoked the right of nondiscrimination
“enshrined in article 14 of the European Convention,” and even added
that “[t]he danger of unjustiªed discrimination is acute at times when
national security is threatened.”59 Nevertheless, he accepted “the need
for a collective approach to terrorism [and] spoke of an appropriate
degree of deference to the actions of the executive, which he regarded
as proportionate to what is necessary.”60 Similarly, “[i]n arguing against
the SIAC ruling, ‘Lord Goldsmith (. . . the Attorney General), said that
the attacks on the World Trade Cent[er] and the Pentagon had
changed for ever the landscape of terrorism,’ and he argued that the
                                                                                                                     
54 See, e.g., Law No. 2001–1062 of Nov. 15, 2001, J.O. Nov. 16, 2001, p. 18,215 (Fr.). This
statute has been criticized for excessive restriction of freedoms to cope with security con-
cerns, but does not distinguish between citizens and noncitizens. See id.
55 See Balance Between Freedom and Security, supra note 48, at 25–28 (discussing
the issue of personal data protection in the EU and its Member States after Sept. 11).
56 See ATCSA, c. 24, §§ 21–32 (Eng.), available at http://www.legislation.hmso.gov/uk/
acts/acts2001/20010024.htm. Detention provisions are in Part 4 of the Act, labeled “Im-
migration and Asylum.” Id. pt. 4.
57 Alvaro Gil-Robles, Opinion 1/2002 of the Commissioner on Human Rights, Mr. Alvaro Gil-
Robles, on Certain Aspects of the United Kingdom 2001 Derogation from Article 5 par. 1 of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights 8 (Aug. 28, 2002).
58 See A, X and Y v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t (A, X, and Y), 2002 Q.B. 335,
355–56, 359–60, 361–62 (Eng. C.A.). Sir David Williams, The United Kingdom’s Response to
International Terrorism, 13 Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 683, 695–96 (2003) (discussing the A,
X and Y decision).
59 A, X and Y, 2002 Q.B. at 347, 348.
60 Williams, supra note 58, at 696.
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detention provisions in the 2001 Act represented ‘a balance between
the interests of the suspected individuals and the interests of the Com-
munity as a whole to be protected from terrorism.’”61 In its judgment
on October 25, 2002, the Court of Appeal broadly agreed.62 Lord Jus-
tice Brooke noted, “[I]t has been a longstanding feature of interna-
tional law that a state is entitled to treat non-nationals differently from
nationals in time of war or other public emergency threatening its life
as a nation.”63 Why discrimination against noncitizens was required to
face that threat, however, remained unexplained. The decision pointed
out that no discrimination could be found if those affected by the
measures were otherwise deportable under immigration law; as the in-
dividuals concerned could be deported absent the risk of torture or
inhuman treatment in the receiving country, their speciªc situation
allowed for such speciªc measures.64 This example shows that the
European system does not completely prevent measures that limit the
rights of noncitizens. It also highlights, however, that European gov-
ernments know that they must justify their actions within the ECHR’s
framework, even before individuals bring the case to the European
Court of Human Rights.65 This could explain, in part, why so few indi-
viduals are detained in the United Kingdom under the special proce-
dures.
II. The Limitations on the European Protection of
Fundamental Rights
The main problem for noncitizens in Europe since September 11,
2001 is best understood not as illegitimate discrimination, but as the
use of the accepted citizenship/noncitizenship distinction in novel
ways. Harsh asylum and immigration policies have been fostered by the
connection of terrorists with asylum seekers and immigrants, and the
idea of a potential nexus among all three groups. This connection was
made apparent after attacks in Saudi Arabia and Morocco led four
                                                                                                                     
61 Id.
62 See A, X and Y, 2002 Q.B. at 359, 382.
63 Id. at 377.
64 Id. at 362.
65 See generally id. at 335 (discussing the legitimacy of a UK rule within the Conven-
tion’s framework). According to article 26 of the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights, the Court may only take a case “after all domestic remedies have been exhausted.”
European Convention, supra note 7, art. 26, 213 U.N.T.S. at 238. As a result, British cases
must ªrst be brought before the House of Lords to be received by the European Court of
Human Rights.
210 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 25:197
European countries66 to assemble a group of experts on terrorism and
illegal immigration. Although the link between asylum seekers and ter-
rorism is tenuous at best, asylum requests are now more frequently de-
nied,67 either on the basis of new laws refusing asylum when the asylum
seeker is suspected of terrorist activities68 or through the use of
“proªles” of certain asylum seekers.69 Because some countries have
been conceived to be possible terrorist shelters, asylum seekers from
those countries face additional hurdles. Illegitimate as it is, this distinc-
tion cannot be considered discrimination against noncitizens, because
it distinguishes between asylum seekers, and thus, constitutes discrimi-
nation among noncitizens.
Terrorism has also inspired more restrictive general immigration
policies. Both Spain and Germany have moved to centralize data on
noncitizens to combat terrorism.70 Recent amendments to its Foreign-
ers’ Act (the Ausländergesetz) expand deportation provisions and ban
from entry into Germany any individuals who threaten state security.71
Moreover, Germany has added three new grounds for refusing resident
permits to its anti-terrorism statute: threats against democracy; partici-
pation in violent actions for political reasons; and membership in an
organization fostering international terrorism. Germany may not, how-
ever, deny entry, indeªnitely detain, or deport individuals on the basis
of suspicion alone.72 Thus, despite tightened restrictions governing asy-
lum, Germany has not detained or deported large numbers of foreign
residents.73
                                                                                                                     
66 The nations involved were France, Italy, Spain, and the UK.
67 EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights, Synthesis Re-
port: Conclusions and Recommendations on the Situation of Fundamental Rights
in the European Union and its Member States in 2003, at 54 (2004), http://europa.
eu.int/comm/justice_home/cfr_cdf/doc/synthesis_report_2003_en.pdf (criticizing EU
Member States for their low levels of recognition of refugee status). Greece has a signiªcantly
lower approval rate for asylum seekers than the average of EU member states; its approval
rate is 0.3%, while the EU’s rate is 15.8%. Id.
68 See, e.g., ATCSA, c. 24, §§ 33, 89 (laying down speciªc conditions for arrest and de-
tention of asylum seekers suspected of having links with terrorism); Balance Between
Freedom and Security, supra note 48, at 40 (discussing the German Act for the Fight
Against Terrorism, which uses article 1F of the Geneva Convention to refuse asylum to
people having links with terrorist activities).
69 See Balance Between Freedom and Security, supra note 48, at 21.
70 See id. at 29.
71 See Shawn Boyne, The Future of Liberal Democracies in a Time of Terror: A Comparison of
The Impact on Civil Liberties in the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States, 11 Tulsa J.
Comp. & Int’l L. 111, 121 (2003) (discussing the second German anti-terror package).
72 Id.
73 Id. at 175.
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In sum, the threat of terrorism has fueled a general trend to re-
strict the rights of asylum seekers and harden immigration policies.
The harshest blows have been dealt within the immigration policies of
sovereign nations, where the European system of human rights pro-
tection ends. The same trend is discernable at the EU level, where a
number of measures have been adopted to ªght terrorism.74 Indeed,
it was deemed necessary to cooperate in this matter as in other crimi-
nal matters of international import.75 Terrorism is one concern for
which the EU system of cooperation in criminal matters is fully war-
ranted. These measures generally do not distinguish noncitizens from
citizens, with the exception of the European Council recommenda-
tion on developing “terrorist proªles.”76 In cooperation with Europol,
the EU uses nationality as one element of terrorist identiªcation in
creating these proªles to isolate terrorist targets and collect data.77
At the same time, Member States have been eager to further their
hardline asylum and immigration policies through common measures.
Coordination and cooperation in police and judicial matters can be
very efªcient levers. Indeed, in the ªeld of asylum and illegal immigra-
tion, September 11 has ushered in a new era for the EU.78 It has helped
                                                                                                                     
74 See, e.g., Council Decision 2003/48/JHA of 19 December 2002 on the Implementa-
tion of Speciªc Measures for Police and Judicial Cooperation to Combat Terrorism in
Accordance with article 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP, 2003 O.J. (L 16) 68, 69
(deªning terrorist offense and addressing communication between Member States);
Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on Combating Terrorism,
2002 O.J. (L 164) 3, 4–6 (requiring Member States to deªned and penalize certain acts as
terrorist offenses); Council Recommendation of 9 December 1999 on Cooperation in
Combating the Financing of Terrorist Groups, 1999 O.J. (C 373) 1 (recommending Mem-
ber State cooperation in “combating the ªnancing of terrorist groups.”).
75 See Treaty on EU, supra note 4, at 21–28 (recommending police and judicial coop-
eration among Member States in criminal matters).
76 See Council Recommendation of 14 October 2002 on the Development of Terrorist
Proªles, Doc. 118581/02, rev. 1, at 5, available at http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/
02/st11/11858-r1en2.pdf.
77 Id. at 4–5. As pointed out by the EU Network of Independent Experts, as long as the
relation between this criterion and the risk of terrorism has not been proved, those
proªles constitute a violation of the principle of nondiscrimination. Balance Between
Freedom and Security, supra note 48, at 21.
78 See, e.g., Council Regulation 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 Establishing the Criteria
and Mechanisms for Determining the Member State Responsible for Examining an Asy-
lum Application Lodged in One of the Member States by a Third-country National, 2003
O.J. (L 50) 1 (requiring a common policy on asylum seekers); Council Directive
2002/90/EC of 28 November 2002 Deªning the Facilitation of Unauthorised Entry, Tran-
sit and Residence, 2002 O.J. (L 328) 17 (requiring Member States to sanction those who
intentionally assist illegal immigration); Council Framework Decision 2002/946/JHA of 28
November 2002 on the Strengthening of the Penal Framework to Prevent the Facilitation
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the Union progress beyond ground previously cleared by the Schengen
Agreements of the 1990s.79 But security measures invariably implicate
other values. The European Union has increasingly appeared to some
as a fortress trying to protect itself from “dangerous aliens,” not so
much because they could be terrorists, but because they are seen as a
threat to the social and economic security of Europe.
Once again, the issue of asylum is illustrative. The European Un-
ion has adopted a regulation establishing the criteria and mechanisms
to determine which Member State would be responsible for examining
asylum applications of third country nationals.80 Because the regulation
implies that only one state will consider the application, the EU has ef-
fectively closed all doors but one to asylum seekers. Similarly, the
United Kingdom has proposed the creation of transit processing cen-
ters—special zones at the borders of the European Union where asy-
lum seekers could be detained. Some have expressed regret that, rather
than seeking to protect asylum seekers, Europe is seeking to protect
itself from them.81
This attitude of suspicion and rejection against newcomers iso-
lates the limits of the European system for the protection of funda-
mental rights. Although this system guarantees a certain level of pro-
tection to migrants trying to enter and settle in the EU, it falls short of
preventing closure of the European fortress to newcomers. There is,
however, another more hopeful aspect to recent developments at the
EU level. The rights of nationals in third countries are at last ap-
proaching those of all European residents.82 Although it is not yet the
case, emerging concepts of European citizenship may ultimately un-
dermine the distinction between citizens and noncitizens of Member
States, provided the latter are integrated into the EU.
                                                                                                                     
of Unauthorised Entry, Transit and Residence, 2002 O.J. (L 328) 1 (requiring Member
States to criminally penalize facilitation of illegal immigration).
79 See Schengen Agreement on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at Their Common
Borders, June 14, 1985, Belg.-Fr.-F.R.G.-Lux.-Neth., 30 I.L.M. 68 (1991) (Convention apply-
ing the Agreement enacted June 19, 1990) [hereinafter Schengen Agreement]. The
Schengen Agreements were concluded between some EC countries to ensure free move-
ment of persons and abolish checks at the borders. Id. pmbl., 30 I.L.M. at 73. As a result,
these countries have set up a system of cooperation for the protection of the exter-
nal borders and adopted a number of measures to ªght illegal immigration. See id. arts. 9,
17, 30 I.L.M. at 76–77, 79.
80 See generally Council Regulation 343/2003, supra note 78 (establishing criteria for
deciding which Member State is responsible).
81 Nathalie Ferré, Au Lieu de les Protéger, l’Europe se Protège des Réfugiés, Le Monde, June
19, 2003, at http://www.gisti.org/doc/presse/2003/ferre/thessalonique.html.
82 See EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 20; see also discussion infra Part III.
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III. European Citizenship and the Fading Color of
Nationality in the EU
In the Member States, the construction of the EU has blurred the
distinction between citizens and noncitizens.83 One reason for this is
that there are no longer two categories of people in Member States
but three: citizens of a Member State, citizens of other Member States,
and third country citizens.
For Member States, the distinction between citizens and nationals
of other Member States has diminished in importance due to the com-
bination of two factors: the prohibition of discrimination against resi-
dents of other Member States84 and the creation of European citizen-
ship.85 According to article 17 of the EC Treaty, citizenship of the
Union is recognized for every person who holds citizenship in a Mem-
ber State.86 In conjunction with these two factors, Community rights of
free movement and residence profoundly affected the ways in which
states view and treat citizens of other Member States.87 Notions such as
“immigrant,” “resident alien,” or “temporary guest” are replaced by the
concept of “Union citizen” with equal rights, at least as far as Member
State citizens are concerned.88 As one commentator notes:
[T]he physical presence of Community nationals in the ter-
ritory of another Member State and their engagement in
economic activities there ha[s] ceased to be a matter of state
permission and tolerance. It has been a matter of exercising
fundamental rights. Qualiªed Community nationals, includ-
ing workers, work-seekers, self-employed persons, providers
and recipients of services, their family members and EEA na-
tionals are entitled to enter the territory of a Member State
and to reside without obtaining leave to remain.89
                                                                                                                     
83 See generally Yves Lequette, La Nationalité Française Dévaluée, in L’Avenir du Droit,
Mélanges en Hommage à François Terré 349 (1999) (criticizing this evolution from a
French point of view).
84 See EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 12.
85 See id. art. 17.
86 Id.
87 Theodora Kostakopoulou, Nested “Old” and “New” Citizenships in the European Union:
Bringing out the Complexity, 5 Colum. J. Eur. L. 389, 393 (1999).
88 Id. at 391–93.
89 Id. at 397.
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Under decisions of the European Court of Justice, Union citizenship
requires increasing equality90 and dampens remaining restrictions to
free movement and residence.91
This evolution, however, still excludes those who are not EU citi-
zens—so-called “third country nationals”—who do not enjoy the rights
granted to European citizens.92 These are the individuals who may be
deprived of rights granted to EU citizens when citizenship of the Union
is conceived as a privileged status. In these circumstances, nationality is
indisputably a fading criterion at the EU level as far as Member State
nationality is concerned. Nationality in general, however, is not neces-
sarily a fading criterion, because third country nationality remains a
justiªcation for limiting the rights of many. According to the European
Commission of Human Rights, the integration of Member States into
the EU legal order is considered a legitimate ground for distinguishing
EU nationals from third country nationals.93 Many also acknowledge
that the creation of EU citizenship has strengthened the exclusion-
ary/discriminatory status of third country nationals in Europe.94 I
share this view. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU conªrms
that the EU does grant certain speciªc rights to its citizens that are un-
available to third country nationals.95
                                                                                                                     
90 See, e.g., Case 85/96, Martinez Sala v. Freistaat Boyern, 1998 E.C.R. 2691, 2705–06
(stating that justiªcation for equality of treatment between nationals and non-nationals
residing in Germany is based on the legal status of Union citizens, which is guaranteed to a
national of any Member State living in another Member State).
91 See, e.g., Case C-413/99, Baumbast & R. v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, ¶ 91
(2002), at http://europa.eu.int (requiring restrictions on free movement to pass a propor-
tionality test).
92 See Paul Craig & Gráinne De Búrca, European Union Law 754 (3d ed. 2003);
Hans Ulrich Jessurun d’Oliviera, Nationality and the European Union after Amsterdam, in Le-
gal Issues of the Amsterdam Treaty 395, 395–97 (David O’Keefe & Patrick Twomey
eds., 1999); Jo Shaw, Citizenship of the Union: Towards Post-National Membership?, in Col-
lected Courses of the Academy of European Law 237, 268–72 (Academy of European
Law ed., 1995); Norbert Reich, Union Citizenship—Metaphor or Source of Rights?, 7 Eur. L. J.
4, 15–18 (2001).
93 C. v. Belgium, 12 Eur. Ct. H.R. 916, 925 (1996).
94 See David O’Keeffe, Union Citizenship, in Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty
87, 104–07 (David O’Keeffe & Patrick M. Twomey eds., 1994); Marco Martiniello, European
Citizenship, European Identity and Migrants: Towards the Postnational State?, in Migration and
European Integration: The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion 37, 40–41 (Robert
Miles & Dietrich Thränhardt eds., 1995); Dora Kostakopoulou, The European Citizenship
Menu: Modes and Options, 7 J. Eur. Pub. Pol’y 477, 480 (2000); Theodora Kostakopoulou,
European Citizenship and Immigration After Amsterdam: Openings, Silences, Paradoxes, 24 J. Eth-
nic & Migration Stud. 640, 645–47 (1998). See generally European citizenship: An In-
stitutional Challenge 115–248 (Massimo La Torre ed., 1998) (containing essays dis-
cussing the relationship between nationality and citizenship).
95 See Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra note 11, arts. 39, 40, 45, at 18, 19.
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Nevertheless, the most recent developments in EU law arguably
advance toward greater synchronization of the rights of European citi-
zens and third country nationals, provided the latter are integrated into
Union territory .96 In addition, a more objective concept of citizenship
is proliferating.97 Nationality is not a proper criterion with which to
build European unity.98 Because no European nationality exists, and
because the EU is bonded by concerns for economic freedoms rather
than civil or political rights, the conception of the European citizenship
must depart from this criterion.99
Two cornerstones of the European Union identity, the construc-
tion of the common market and protection of fundamental rights
play a signiªcant role in this evolution, paving the way for the decline
of nationalities.
First, the decline is intertwined with the market-oriented identity
of the EU. The common market has been the engine of integration
even if it is no longer the sole unifying factor. The logic of market inte-
gration explains why the primary rights of EU citizens are free move-
ment and equality. From a free-market point of view, it is irrational to
deprive economic actors of economic freedoms solely because of na-
tionality.100 Consequently, nationality is not a proper criterion to ensure
efªcient market functioning, for it impedes the dissolution of the bor-
ders separating Member States. Although it has not been easy for
Member States to accept the limitation of their control over nonciti-
zens, the European Community naturally requires the progressive ex-
tension of economic freedom to all economic actors in the common
market.101
                                                                                                                     
96 See discussion infra Part III.
97 See Bruno Nascimbene, Nationality Laws and Citizenship of the European Union: Towards
a European Law on Nationality?, in Nationality Laws in the European Union 1, 10–11
(Bruno Nascimbene ed., 1996) (discussing the merit of replacing the “subjective standard
of nationality” by the “objective standard of residence or domicile”); see also Steve Peers,
Building Fortress Europe: The Development of EU Migration Law, 35 Common Mkt. L. Rev.
1235, 1268–71 (1998) (noting the absence of political will for such a reform).
98 See Nascimbene, supra note 97, at 1–18.
99 See id.
100 See Theodora Kostakopoulou, “Integrating” Non-EU Migrants in the European Union:
Ambivalent Legacies and Mutating Paradigms, 8 Colum. J. Eur. L. 181, 197–98 (2002) (dis-
cussing the logic of market integration as a factor undermining the importance of nation-
ality).
101 See e.g., EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 49 (allowing the Council to extend the scope
of free provision of services to nationals of a third country).
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It must also be noted that the abolition of physical borders divid-
ing the EU cannot be conªned to nationals of Member States.102 It is
inconceivable for checks to be maintained against only third country
nationals. To achieve free movement of people under the Schengen
Agreements, Member States were forced to relinquish control of the
entry of third country nationals from other Member States.103 As many
have underscored, this has triggered a surge in security measures to
control the external border and fostered repression of illegal immigra-
tion. As a result, the Schengen acquis, now inserted in the treaties, is
hardly known as a gateway to Europe for third country nationals, but
rather as the foundation of a fortress Europe. However, third country
nationals do have certain limited rights of entry and short-term stay
once they have been admitted into any Member State.
It should come as no surprise that the evolution toward an ex-
tended right to free movement and residence for third country nation-
als is a long and complex process. Member States ªrst must accept the
degradation of their control over citizens of other Member States. This
has not yet been completely achieved. Although free movement is a
fundamental right for nationals of Member States and a right granted
to European citizens, Member States have not completely surrendered
their powers in this domain.104 The right to move and reside freely in
another Member State still carries conditions, albeit with diminished
state authority since the recent case law of the European Court of Jus-
tice, which has required a balancing approach in light of European citi-
zenship.105 As long as the right for the citizens of the Union to move
and reside freely within the territory of the Member States is subject to
limitations and conditions,106 however, Member States remain entitled
to control their legal status and to deport them if they fall beyond treaty
requirements.107 In addition, Member States may derogate from the
                                                                                                                     
102 See Schengen Agreement, supra note 79, art. 2, 30 I.L.M. at 86 (providing for re-
moval of border checks between some EU Member States).
103 See id. art. 19, 30 I.L.M. at 92.
104 See discussion supra pp. 17–18.
105 See, e.g., Baumbast, ¶ 91 (requiring that conditions for citizens to beneªt from free
movement pass a proportionality test).
106 See EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 18.
107 See id. However, the case law of the European Court of Justice has made it impossible
to deport EU citizens for merely lacking proper documentation, as long as they fullªll the
conditions necessary to beneªt from the right to enter and reside in the territory. Coordina-
tion of national measures limiting the movement and residence of foreign nationals—
justiªed on public policy, public security or public health grounds—has been achieved by
Directive 64/221 of February 25, 1964, which curbs the powers of Member States. Council
Directive 64/221/EEC of 25 Feb. 1964 on the Consideration of Special Measures Concerning
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provisions relating to freedom of movement for reasons of public pol-
icy, public security or public health,108 notwithstanding the fact that
these exceptions have been strictly construed.109
Widening the freedom of movement and equality principles to
include third country nationals requires further, more difªcult steps.
Member States have been understandably reluctant to accept Euro-
pean Court of Justice rulings, in which broad interpretations of the
right to family reuniªcation have challenged the application of na-
tional immigration laws. For instance, they may not have expected
that a spouse’s right to enter and reside on their territory could pre-
vent them from deporting a third country national who never ob-
tained a visa, whose visa expired, or who entered the territory unlaw-
fully.110 They may also not have expected that they could no longer
require work permits for third country nationals employed by a serv-
ice provider established in the European Union.111
Nevertheless, a recent directive on the rights of long-term resi-
dents indicates a changing situation.112 It is indeed a very small step
forward, as the conditions of reaping its beneªts are rather restric-
tive,113 but its clear purpose is to give third country nationals a status
“comparable” to that of European citizens. One major right of Euro-
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pean citizens, the right to move and reside freely within the Commu-
nity, is granted to noncitizens,114 although it has been stressed that the
freedom is far from comprehensive.115 In addition, the directive lays
down a principle of nondiscrimination with a large scope of applica-
tion. Equal treatment is extended to a large number of economic and
social rights: employment, education, vocational training, social protec-
tion, recognition of diplomas, and housing.116 The new directive on
family reuniªcation, much criticized for setting forth lower standards
than a number of national laws,117 also contributes to the new focus on
the “rights” rather than repression of third country nationals.118 As a
result, rights of European citizens and third country nationals are
brought somewhat closer together. Is it time to reconsider the idea that
“long-term resident third country nationals . . . have been relegated to
the periphery of the emerging European civil society”?119
This equalization process is enhanced by the universal conception
of fundamental rights which, as noted in Part I, prevails in the EU
Charter of Fundamental Rights. Although some insist that the Charter
does not place citizens and noncitizens on equal footing because it re-
serves certain rights to citizens, I ªnd it signiªcant that the chapter of
the Charter devoted to citizens’ rights contains rights that are granted
to “every person” or to any “person residing . . . in a Member State.”120
Some may contend that whenever citizens’ rights are granted to non-
citizens, they simply cease to be citizens’ rights and become human
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rights. I would rather take it as evidence that the concept of European
citizenship itself is not always grounded on distinction and privileges
for nationals.121 Most of all, the Charter indicates that European citi-
zenship can be disengaged from reference to nationality, and that third
country nationals can belong to the Community.
Citizenship of Member States has not, however, lost all its value.
The most potent political right, the right to vote, is still exclusive to
nationals of Member States or European citizens. Nothing indicates
that this will change soon. In this realm, the only right of signiªcance
granted by EU citizenship is the right of the national of one Member
State to take part in municipal elections in another Member State.122
Participation in the election of the European Parliament in other
Member States, which is also recognized for European citizens, does
not create a new right to participate in the political process, as this
right belongs to every national of a Member State.123 It only allows
participation in another Member State. For the rest, participation in
the political decision at the EU level is indirect and ºows from par-
ticipation in national elections through which governments sitting in
the Council are elected. Currently, third country nationals are ex-
cluded from political participation, unless Member States decide of
their own volition to offer them some political rights.
Evolution in this ªeld depends on two equally difªcult steps. The
ªrst one, justiªed by an inclusive conception of citizenship, would be
to extend the prospect of European citizenship to those other than
the peoples of Member States, to include third country nationals in
the quorum of European citizens. The second would be to require
that Member States recognize as their own citizens a number of third
country nationals. In this highly sensitive ªeld of national sovereignty
and national diversity, the mere evocation of such an idea may seem
sufªcient only for European utopists.
Furthermore, it may be impossible to reconcile the arguments in
favor of a more inclusive citizenship with the harsh measures recently
adopted against noncitizens attempting to enter and reside in the ter-
ritory. If, as one author contends, “[e]xternal rules on entry have . . .
a profound impact on the rules and conditions of Community mem-
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bership,”124 and if ofªcial policy responses to the challenge of immi-
gration reveal much about the nature of a polity and the meaning of
citizenship, our hypothesis of the emergence of a more inclusive citi-
zenship may be illusory.125
Still, the European Union’s ambition in the immigration ªeld has
a binary dimension. Inspired by the policies of Member States, it re-
lies on two pillars: the ªght against illegal immigration and the inte-
gration of long-term residents. To this rather classic scheme, the
European Union could add a new conception of citizenship derived—
as the Directive on long-term residents and the reference to residents
in the Charter of Fundamental Rights suggest—from a form of inte-
gration into European society.
This, of course, leaves open the deªnition of integration and the
selection of those who become equal by virtue of integration. This
issue is a very sensitive one indeed. In deciding on the scope of appli-
cation of the directives granting rights to third country nationals
(long-term residents and family reuniªcation), the EU has indicated
which criteria could be used. It relies mostly, in the usual way, on the
operation of time: duration of legal residence is often determinative.
Time may not always prove sufªcient, however, if integration becomes
the major criterion. The recent French immigration statute provides
an illustration: in addition to requiring two further years of legal resi-
dence to grant a resident permit with the pretext of the new EU legis-
lation, it requires “republican integration in the French society, which
will be assessed namely through sufªcient knowledge of the French
language and principles on which the French Republic is founded.”126
Such a requirement, for the mere purpose of a resident permit, may
trigger two reactions. On the one hand, one may fear that the re-
quirements for granting French citizenship will increase in due pro-
portion. On the other hand, however, if legal residence is the key to
equality and the real line along which rights and freedoms are
granted—and eventually, European citizenship—it should come as no
surprise that integration is required to grant a resident permit. Were
it so, nationality would be fading indeed.
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